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1. INTRODUCTION
State consent is an important source of legitimacy for the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). State consent is seen as an expres-
sion of a state's own free will and, therefore, when a state consents
to a WTO agreement, it can be assumed that WTO membership is
in its best interests.1 State consent is also an expression of a state's
Legal Sovereignty. 2 Therefore, Appellate Body and panel decisions
that are consistent with state consent can also be considered legiti-
mate because they reinforce states' Legal Sovereignty.
State Legal Sovereignty is, however, only one understanding of
sovereignty. This Article adopts Stephen Krasner's view of sover-
eignty as comprising different and logically independent mean-
* Trade lawyer in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
("DFAT") and S.J.D. Candidate at the University of Michigan Law School, Ann
Arbor. The views expressed in this Article are' not necessarily those of DFAT or
the Australian Government. I would like to thank Robert Howse, Jurgen Kurtz,
Simon Farbenbloom, and David Morgan for their useful feedback on an earlier
version of this Article that was presented at a conference titled, "The WTO at a
Crossroads" held at Bar Ilan University, Israel, in December 2004. This Article has
further benefited from comments received during that conference. I would also
like to thank the University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, for providing
funding to attend the conference. Naturally, all mistakes are my own.
I See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (stat-
ing that "[i]nternational law governs relations between.., states. The rules of law
binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between those co-existing independ-
ent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims."). But see
Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making,
12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 45 (1988) (drawing a distinction between free will and
state consent while observing that "coercion is a fact of international life. It is ab-
solutely impossible to speak of 'free will' in the international society. But this
does not impede states in consenting to the rules of international law.").
2 Stephen Krasner refers to this dimension of state sovereignty as "Interna-
tional Legal Sovereignty." STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY 4 (1999). In this Article I refer to it as "Legal Sovereignty."
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ings. In order to understand the relationship between state sover-
eignty and the WTO and the implications for the VVTO's legiti-
macy, Section 2 also takes the approach that the implications of
membership in the WTO can only be assessed after we consider the
impact of the globalization of the international system and the in-
creasing power asymmetries between states on state sovereignty.
Therefore, Section 2 also discusses how globalization, the devel-
opment of intergovernmental networks, and the increased power
asymmetries among states have affected state sovereignty. It is in
this light that the impact of the WTO on state sovereignty is as-
sessed, and the argument is made that the WTO strengthens, rather
than undermines, state sovereignty.
From the perspective of state sovereignty, state consent to the
WTO is the starting point for any assessment of the WTO's legiti-
macy. There are, however, limits to the extent that states' consent
to the WTO agreements can explain why states should comply
with their WTO obligations. For instance, the extent that states
were able to meaningfully participate in the negotiating rounds
limits the extent that state consent can legitimate Appellate Body
decisions. Section 3 of the Article considers some of these limits in
greater detail.
Section 4 of this Article analyzes the extent to which Appellate
Body and panel decisions are consistent with states' consent as an
important source of WTO legitimacy. For instance, if the text of the
WTO agreements is assumed to capture state's consent, attention
to the text is the most important source of legitimacy for Appellate
Body decisions. Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties also points to the text of the WTO agreements as the
foundation for any interpretative exercise.
Nevertheless, the text of the WTO agreements is often vague
and ambiguous. As a result, the Appellate Body is often unable to
base its decisions entirely on the text. Yet because of the signifi-
cance of the text as a source of legitimacy, the Appellate Body has
increasingly attempted to justify its decisions by strict textual
analysis of the applicable WTO agreements. For example, the Ap-
pellate Body often uses the dictionary to define terms, and relies on
a detailed examination of the sentence construction of WTO provi-
sions to justify their decisions.
This Article argues that as a result of vague, ambiguous, and
incomplete WTO texts, the Appellate Body has, despite its attempt
at textual justifications, often been forced to rely on other justifica-
tions for its decisions. Section 4 and Section 5, therefore, use these
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different meanings of state sovereignty to suggest justifications for
Appellate Body decisions beyond state consent that are still consis-
tent with or reinforce other meanings of state sovereignty.
2. WTO MEMBERSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
The concept of sovereignty includes a number of different
meanings that are related but logically independent. 3 Therefore, it
is possible to reinforce one dimension of sovereignty while under-
mining another. Furthermore, the impact of the WTO on state sov-
ereignty depends on our understanding of state sovereignty. For
instance, cooperation between states may be necessary in order for
states to govern effectively.4 One way of cooperating is through
international organizations. While membership in an international
organization is an expression of states' Legal Sovereignty, mem-
bership may nevertheless undermine states' Westphalian Sover-
eignty.
The implications of membership in the WTO for state sover-
eignty have a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical
dimension is the effect on state sovereignty as a result of the rela-
tionship established between the WTO and each member state.
The horizontal dimension focuses on how WTO membership ef-
fects interstate relations. The horizontal and vertical implications
for state sovereignty of membership in the WTO needs to be as-
sessed in light of both the increasing interdependence and global-
ization of the international system and the power asymmetries that
exist between states. For instance, irrespective of whether a state is
a member of the WTO, there exists a variance between states de-
fined as legally equal, and what some refer to as behavioral sover-
eignty- the level of sovereignty that most states are in fact able to
exercise. 5 Similarly, power asymmetries amongst states also un-
dermine states' Westphalian Sovereignty, leading to the result that
most states are not fully sovereign.6 This is particularly true in to-
3 See supra text accompanying note 2.
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 285 (2004).
5 Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 329, 331-32
(2004).
6 See Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 195, 197 (2004) (stating that sovereignty during the Middle Ages was not
absolute but rather shared); see also KRASNER, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that a
loss of interdependence sovereignty would imply a loss of domestic sovereignty
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day's politically and economically integrated world.7
This suggests that the WTO can reinforce rather than under-
mine state sovereignty. In fact, Kal Raustiala has argued that "in-
ternational institutions are now the primary means by which states
may prosper and achieve social objectives. Consequently they are
the primary means by which states may reassert or express their
sovereignty."8 Therefore, the effects of the WTO on states' sover-
eignty and the legitimacy of the WTO will vary between states.9
For instance, for many states that obtained independence in the
1950s, membership in the United Nations was desired in order to
affirm their sovereignty.' 0 Similarly today, membership in the
WTO can be as much about acceptance by the international com-
munity as it is about the specific trade benefits the WTO can de-
liver (for example, the membership of Cambodia and Nepal). For
many states, the WTO will provide them with the ability to exer-
cise aspects of sovereignty that they did not previously have the
power to exercise."
Globalization and power asymmetries between states also have
important implications for the form of sovereignty that states are
capable of exercising. When assessing the legitimacy of the WTO
through its impact on state sovereignty, we need to keep in mind
the real level of sovereignty that states, absent their membership in
the WTO, would be able to exercise. Therefore, when participation
by states in the WTO allows them to more fully exercise sover-
eignty in today's world, "international economic institutions can be
understood as a positive force for sovereignty, not a threat."
12
in regards to domestic control).
7 Robert 0. Keohane, Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions,
in IDEAS AND IDEALS: ESSAYS ON POLITICS IN HONOR OF STANLEY HOFFMAN 91 (Linda
B. Miller & Michael Joseph Smith eds., 1993).
8 Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate In International Economic Law,
6 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 841, 860 (2003) [hereinafter Raustiala, Rethinking].
9 Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International Law and Democratic
Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 329 (2001).
10 Radon, supra note 6, at 199. See generally Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of
Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 264-
268 (1996) (stating that one of the United Nations' major purposes was self-
determination, which became synonymous with the decolonization movement).
" See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 330-33 (noting that that full sovereignty may
not be exercised due to a lack of institutional or political capacity).
12 Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 856. See James Bacchus, A Few
Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and the WTO, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 670 (2004) (ob-
serving that "as I see it, the success of the WTO makes sovereign states stronger,
not weaker"); Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai
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2.1. Legal Sovereignty
Legal Sovereignty refers to the juridical independence and
equality of states.13 The legal equality of all states is affirmed in
Article 2.1 of the United Nations ("UN") Charter, which states that
"[tihe organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equal-
ity of all its Members." The requirement of state consent before a
state can be bound by international treaty obligations is therefore
an expression of states' Legal Sovereignty. 14 Because consent is an
expression of a state's Legal Sovereignty, the WTO gains some le-
gitimacy because it was consented to by its member states.
15
The extent to which WTO membership affects states' Legal
Sovereignty depends on whether we use a "revocability-based
conception" of state sovereignty or a "veto-based conception."
16
Under a veto-based conception, membership in the WTO impli-
cates states' Legal Sovereignty when membership "create[s] a
process that generates rules or decisions that they cannot veto ex
post."1 7 As a result of the negative consensus rule in articles 16.4
and 17.14 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"),
states' Legal Sovereignty is affected by membership in the WTO
because they are unable to veto panel and Appellate Body deci-
sions.18
However, any assessment of the implications for state sover-
Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New
Millennium, 34 (2004) (stating that "[i]n committing to the WTO and its procedures
and disciplines, governments are returning to themselves a degree of 'sover-
eignty' lost through the process of globalization").
13 See KRASNER, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining sovereignty in the classic model
of international law).
14 Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALuES 28 (1995).
15 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 796 (2003) ("[flor any treaty-based rule, it is plausi-
ble to say that each nation will decide, and if it decides to accept the treaty obliga-
tions, its consent has legitimized its obligation."); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of
Federal Powers to International Organizations: New Problems With Old Solutions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 71, 128 (2000) ("[I]nternational organizations [of which the United
States is a member] depend on the legitimacy provided by state consent to mem-
bership.").
16 Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 846-48.
17 Id. at 847. For an argument that membership rarely implicates state sover-
eignty under this conception because most delegations are revocable, see id. at
846-47.
18 See id. at 847-48 (noting that "member states have lost sovereignty to the
WTO because they lack veto power over adverse judgments, even though they
can ultimately exit the WTO if they choose").
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eignty needs to be made in light of how state sovereignty has fared
in a world characterized by increasing globalization and power
asymmetries between states. In this regard, there is a significant
variance between states defined as legally equal and the level of
power that they can in fact exercise.
Panel and Appellate Body decisions can move member states
closer to the formal equality of underlying Legal Sovereignty by
shifting power away from the older General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") 194 7-style diplomatic settlements of trade
disputes in which processes and outcomes were more likely to re-
flect the power imbalances amongst member states.19 Strengthen-
ing the rules-based trading system has, to some extent, contained
the role of power in the trading system because the same WTO law
is applied to all member states.20 Therefore, the legalization of
states' trading relations under the WTO has helped legitimate
WTO membership by reducing the ability of member states to take
advantage of existing power asymmetries.
2.2. Westphalian Sovereignty
Westphalian Sovereignty is another meaning of state sover-
eignty. It describes the arrangement of the international political
arena based on the division of the world into territorially exclusive
units and includes the right to exclude external actors, whether
other states or international organizations, from interfering in do-
mestic political structures.21 States' Westphalian Sovereignty is
therefore implicated "if the rulers of a state enter into an agreement
that recognizes external authority structures." 22
Some commentators have noted that this territorially-based
conception of sovereignty has nevertheless been eroded by the in-
19 See Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355, 361 (Jean-Marc Coicaud &
Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001) (contrasting the Uruguay Round negotiations, in
which the United States and the European Union negotiated a deal and then pre-
sented it to the rest of the membership, with WTO rules, which are developed us-
ing input from many sources and then serve as a stable and predictable guide for
decision-makers).
20 See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Hal Truths and Conse-
quences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 443 (2000) (discussing how the United States contin-
ues to abide by judgements of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, even
when they involve serious modifications to U.S. tax laws or grave trade retalia-
tion).
21 KRASNER, supra note 2, at 20.
22Id. at4.
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creasingly international forms of economic arrangements and
transactions -that "spaces of networks" instead of "spaces of
places" has become the dominant paradigm in the international
system.23 As a result, in order for states to effectively govern
economies that have assumed increasingly transnational dimen-
sions, domestic regulatory bodies and government agencies have
had to overcome their territorial limitations by cooperating with
other state's agencies to address the challenges posed by an inter-
national economy. 24 This has given rise to transgovernmental net-
works.25
However, the increasing prevalence of networks between gov-
ernment agencies has challenged traditional notions of West-
phalian Sovereignty, and further, these networks often replicate
the power asymmetries that exist between states.26 For example,
the framework for cooperation between the United States Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and other foreign securities regula-
tors "deliberately seeks to transplant features of U.S. securities
regulation abroad."27 Anne-Marie Slaughter has also observed that
"[tihe United States has historically favored the network approach
precisely because it has differed substantially with many other
countries, including some of its most important trading partners,
on the need for and the substance of a vigorous antitrust policy,
and thus has much to lose in multilateral negotiations."
28
Further, Saskia Sassen has argued that, "[tihe state itself has
been a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it
has emerged quite altered by this participation," and that the
mechanisms of globalization and integration of the global economy
23 Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty:
The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 425,
432-35 (1999).
24 Id. at 447; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Infor-
mation Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1047 (2003).
25 See Ann-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183,
184-85 (1997) (describing the disaggregation of the state into distinct parts, such as
courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and legislatures, which network with their
counterparts abroad to create a "transgovernmental order"); see also ROBERT O.
KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER & INTERDEPENDENCE 257 (3d ed. 2001) (defining
globalism as "networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances").
26 Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 24-25 (2002) [here-
inafter Raustiala, Architecture].
27 Slaughter, supra note 4, at 294.
28 Id. at 296.
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are often concentrated in "global cities" such as New York.29 These
global markets are therefore amenable to regulation by only a lim-
ited number of powerful states. Therefore, while the flow of, for
example, international capital can have enormous ramifications for
state sovereignty, some states are more capable than others of en-
couraging and regulating these markets and, by extension, the im-
pact of globalization on state sovereignty. 30 This also highlights
how decisionmaking authority is not necessarily congruent with
national boundaries, challenging traditional notions of sovereignty
as territorially bounded.31
States' Westphalian Sovereignty is implicated as a result of
membership in the WTO. One of the fundamental norms of West-
phalian Sovereignty is nonintervention in the affairs of another
state. However, Westphalian Sovereignty is a question of author-
ity, not control. 32 As a result, the negative consensus rule, which
leads to the automatic adoption of WTO Appellate Body reports,
affects states' Westphalian Sovereignty. For example, when mem-
ber states are required to alter domestic legislation in order to
comply with adverse Appellate Body rulings, it gives the WTO au-
thority over states' decisionmaking processes.
At the same time, membership in the WTO has strengthened
states' Westphalian Sovereignty. Firstly, the implications of Appel-
late Body decisions over member states' domestic decisionmaking
processes need to be assessed in light of a globalizing world com-
prised of intergovernmental networks. Secondly, the reduction in
the effectiveness of territoriality as the basis for economic govern-
ance and the development of transgovernmental networks have
themselves challenged states' Westphalian Sovereignty. Due to
their sub-treaty-level forms of cooperation, these networks are im-
portant avenues whereby powerful states are able to impose their
29 SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
28-29 (1996).
30 See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 340 (noting that full sovereignty may not be
exercised due to a lack of institutional or political capacity).
31 Jayasuriya, supra note 23, at 434-35. See generally Kal Raustiala, The Evolu-
tion of Territoriality: International Relations & American Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND
CONFLICT IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Miles Kahler & Barbara Walter eds.,
forthcoming 2006) (U.C.L.A. School of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper, Paper No. 05-6 at 27-28), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalTheory/documents/Territoriality.doc
[hereinafter Raustiala, Evolution] (discussing history of the link between territori-
ality and sovereignty).
32 KRASNER, supra note 2, at 20.
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regulatory model on other states. Therefore, from the horizontal
perspective of inter-state relations, membership in the WTO is an
alternative or parallel form of economic governance that can
strengthen states' Westphalian Sovereignty by minimizing the
negative implications of transgovernmental networks.
For example, harmonization through the development of inter-
national standards is an important part of this new form of gov-
ernance. 33 The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT") Agree-
ment in particular also regulates the role of international
standards. 34 However, the WTO's emphasis on consensus may
lead to the development of international standards in ways that are
more consistent with sovereign equality and the rights of states to
exclude external actors, than would transgovernmental networks,
the latter being more susceptible to the imposition of powerful
states' own regulatory models.
35
2.3. Interdependence Sovereignty
Interdependence Sovereignty is another dimension of state
sovereignty, and "refers to the ability of public authorities to regu-
late the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or
capital across the borders of their state." 36 States' Interdependence
Sovereignty is significantly affected by the growing interdepend-
ence and globalization of the world economy. Membership in the
WTO to some extent further erodes states' control over cross-
border flows as they agree to limitations on their ability to restrict
trade in goods and services. These effects can only be properly as-
sessed by first considering the level of control that existed (or
would have existed) prior to membership in the WTO.
For instance, low transport costs and the "communication revo-
lution" expressed through mechanisms such as the internet have
33 Slaughter, supra note 4, at 293.
34 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2 1 4, 6, 9, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
Legal Instruments -Result of the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement]. See generally Steve Charnovitz, International Standards and the
WTO 2-5, 9, 15-25 (Geo Wash. Univ. Law School Pub. Law and Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 133, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=694346 (dis-
cussing the interaction between international standards and the TBT Agreement).
35 See Raustiala, Architecture, supra note 26, at 59 (discussing the tendency for
U.S. regulatory agents to favor their own models, and the incentives to adopt
those models wholesale).
36 KRASNER, supra note 2, at 4.
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made it easier for businesses to disaggregate: producing goods in
one country, assembling them in another, and selling them in a
third country.37 These factors have also driven international travel,
for both business and leisure, as well as international trade.38 The
ease with which large sums of money move between countries
means that decisions made in New York or London have impor-
tant implications for people in Malaysia or South Africa. This in-
creasing interconnectedness also means that war or famine in the
Middle East poses immigration and refugee issues for Australia
and provides the black market economy in drugs and guns greater
opportunities than ever before.
39
The increasing interconnectedness of the world translates into
interdependence when these relationships create mutual depend-
ence, restricting state autonomy and imposing costs. 40 For exam-
ple, growing interdependence and globalization has reduced the
ability of states to achieve optimal policy outcomes acting alone.41
While it is true that not all reductions in autonomy necessarily im-
plicate state sovereignty, the environment within which states now
operate challenges states' sovereignty. 42
37 See Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Infor-
mation Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 23 (2004) (discussing the effects of the
"communication revolution" on business); Jeffrey Frankel, Globalization of the
Economy, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 45, 45 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John
D. Donahue eds., 2000) ("The two major drivers of economic globalization are re-
duced costs to transportation and communication in the private sector.").
38 See generally Frankel, supra note 37, at 58-65 (discussing the effects of eco-
nomic globalization).
39 See Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization and International Narcotics Trafficking, 32
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 89, 91 (1999) (exploring the connection between globaliza-
tion and drug control); see also Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and
Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1999) (con-
sidering the implications of globalization for the state system as a whole).
40 See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 25, at 7-8 (detailing the costs of interde-
pendence).
41 See Judith H. Bello, National Sovereignty and Transnational Problem Solving, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1996) ("[I]n today's global economy, the United
States can better promote economic growth, prosperity, and job creation through
international coorperation, specifically the WTO, than it can acting alone.").
42 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 26-27 (1995); see also
Henkin, supra note 39, at 5-7 (noting various challenges to state sovereignty pre-
viously raised by commentators). See generally Jayasuriya, supra note 23, at 427,
433-35 (arguing that economic globalization has caused a "disjunction between
the territorial nature of sovereignty and the increasing global nature of economic
flows," which demands a new viewpoint which admits that sovereignty is less a
matter of territory and more a polycentric legal order based on networks of regu-
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The increasing interdependence and globalization of the world
has also been referred to as the Americanization of the world.
43
Regardless of whether this is an accurate understanding of the
forces driving the international system, this observation does point
to increasing disparities in power between states.44 These power
asymmetries are another factor which operate in tandem with, and
reinforce the effects of, growing interdependence and globalization
on states' sovereignty.
2.4. A World Without an Effective WTO
An analysis of how the WTO affects state sovereignty must
take into account the environment in which states operate. This
can be demonstrated by consideration of how states would adapt
to a world without an effective WTO.
International organizations like the WTO govern as well as
drive economic globalization. 45 For example, the TBT and the Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary ("SPS") Agreements contain obligations re-
garding the role of states in international standards bodies, the
need to harmonize domestic standards, and the role of mutual rec-
ognition agreements. 46 The WTO's DSU provides a detailed and
effective dispute settlement mechanism under which states settle
their international economic disputes. Furthermore, the range of
issues already dealt with in the WTO increases the scope for issue
linkages and therefore increases the ability to progress negotiations
in a wide variety of areas.47 As a result, a world without an effec-
tive WTO not only threatens the processes of economic liberaliza-
tion, but would also mean the absence of a multilateral institution
capable of governing international economic life.
On the trade liberalization front, states would be left with the
lation between private actors and state agencies).
43 See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 25, at 257 (arguing that "there is some truth"
to understanding "globalism as a network with an American hub").
44 See id. at 9-17 (exploring power and interdependence).
4 5 Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 862.
46 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art.
3, T 4-5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1967
U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]; TBT Agreement, supra note 34, art. 2,
4, 7, art. 5, 4,5.
47 Marco C.E.J. Bronkers, More Power to the WTO? 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 41, 44
(2001).
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option of engaging in unilateral action, either by instituting greater
levels of protection or, alternatively, conditioning access to their
markets on other states making similar concessions; the latter op-
tion would only be effective for economically larger states.
Alternatively, states would seek to promote further economic
liberalization by negotiating bilateral or regional trade agreements
with willing nations. In fact, the apparent difficulties with WTO
negotiations and the impetus this has provided for Free Trade
Agreements ("FTAs") is a window into a world without an effec-
tive WTO. Furthermore, the WTO, with its binding rules and dis-
pute settlement procedures, disciplines the otherwise naked effects
of power asymmetries between states.48 A trading regime gov-
erned by bilateral trade agreements, instead of multilateral nego-
tiations, commitments, and dispute settlement procedures would
magnify these power asymmetries.
The lack of an effective WTO also raises governance issues.49
As discussed, part of the attractiveness for powerful states of gov-
ernance through inter-governmental networks has been the ability
to avoid the compromise that occurs when these issues are dealt
with in a multilateral setting. Networks also provide greater op-
portunities for states to use their soft and hard power to achieve
desired outcomes.50 For example, the failure of the WTO to include
investment and competition in the current negotiating rounds pro-
vided impetus for the United States to promote these regulatory
goals through agency networks,51 leading to "convergence through
regulatory export."52
This suggests that these sub-treaty forms of governance will
48 See generally Alvarez, supra note 20, at 418-19 (pointing out the effects of po-
litical factors on the decisionmaking of international juridical bodies which lack
binding authority).
49 See Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 347, 357-62 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000)
(proposing that WTO mechanisms be designed to allow states to participate selec-
tively, without undermining the international trade governance system as a
whole).
50 JOSEPH S. NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 9 (2002) (defining soft power as "getting others to
want what you want").
51 See generally Slaughter, supra note 4, at 292-95 (remarking that the United
States' mechanisms controlling investments and competition are being shared be-
tween U.S. and foreign agencies).
52 Id.; see Raustiala, Evolution, supra note 31, at 27-28 (noting that the extension
of the economically powerful nations' regulatory laws is one way to encourage
global convergence of regulatory policy).
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become increasingly prevalent. In addition, FTAs and regional
trade agreements also regulate issues such as investment and gov-
ernment procurement, issues that states initially sought to include
in the WTO. As a result, these agreements will assume increasing
importance as mechanisms for global governance. Finally, states
will undoubtedly seek to achieve outcomes in whatever forum is
possible. (For example, witness the attempt to negotiate an agree-
ment on investment in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") in response to the rejection
of such an agreement by the WTO.)
An example of how membership in the WTO can reinforce
states' sovereignty is provided by the Appellate Body's decision in
the Shrimp-Turtle case.53 The United States had negotiated the In-
ter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of
Sea Turtles, which required the parties to use turtle excluder de-
vices ("TEDS") that were suitable for each party's maritime area.
This was in contrast to the United States' application of section 609
to states not party to the Convention, whereby imports of shrimp
into the United States were banned when they were not caught by
boats using TEDs certified as being comparable to their own.
In applying the chapeau to Article XX of GATT, which requires
that measures are not "applied in a manner which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail," the Appellate Body
found that the failure of the United States to negotiate seriously
with the complainants constituted "unjustifiable discrimination,"
particularly in light of their negotiation of the Convention with
Central American and Caribbean states.54 Furthermore, the U.S.
requirement that countries adopt a TED program comparable to
their own failed to exhibit "sufficient flexibility to take into account
the specific conditions prevailing in any exporting Member," and
that this also constituted "unjustifiable discrimination." 55
In the above ruling, the Appellate Body found that a sovereign
member is not prohibited from adopting qualified unilateral meas-
ures that condition access to their markets on the exporting coun-
try's adoption of certain policies.5 6 Therefore, the WTO recognized
53 Appellate Body Report, United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, T 49, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-
Turtle].
54 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 49.
55 Id. 165-166, 172.
56 See id. T 121 (finding that a country can condition access on the adoption of
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
the sovereign right of member states to condition access to their
markets based on their own policies.
Member state sovereignty was also enhanced by the Appellate
Body's finding that the right of member states to condition access
to their markets is limited by an obligation to take into account the
circumstances prevailing in individual member states.57 The Ap-
pellate Body also found that there is an obligation on members,
when applying measures, to be flexible and, circumstances permit-
ting, to attempt to find a negotiated solution. These WTO obliga-
tions require stronger member states to take into account the inter-
ests of weaker states, thereby giving effect to their sovereign
equality. While these limitations on the otherwise sovereign right
to unilateral action apply to all member states, the Appellate
Body's ruling particularly strengthens weaker states' sovereignty.
3. SOME LIMITS TO STATE CONSENT
The extent that state consent can legitimate Appellate Body de-
cisions partly depends on the circumstances under which states
consented to the WTO agreements. Where member states con-
sented under conditions that undermine the claim that states con-
sent to what is in their best interest, state consent loses some of its
ability to legitimate the WTO and Appellate Body decisions.
3.1. Agency Costs
Commentators have noted that the literature on agency costs is
applicable to understanding the information asymmetries and dif-
ferences in interests that can arise in political institutions between
principals and their negotiators. 58 From a state's perspective,
agency costs arise when negotiators agree to WTO rules that are
different from what the government they represent would have ac-
measures that are "important and legitimate in character").
57 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 144,
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) (noting the difference between conditioning
market access on a specific program and conditioning market access to satisfac-
tion of programs comparable in effectiveness).
58 See Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think About the "Democratic Deficit" at the
WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS:
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 79, 82 (Stefan Griller ed.,
2003) (noting that information asymmetries which come from the fact that agents
"typically know more about their task than their principals do" are one of the
challenges in the principal-agent relationship).
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cepted. When this occurs, the quality of state consent is dimin-
ished because the state's consents to WTO agreements that are not
in its best interests.
Agency costs between the state and its WTO negotiators can
arise in a number of ways. For example, because negotiators are
experts, they are often "repeat players" at the WTO. This can lead
negotiators to emphasize good working relationships with negotia-
tors from other states, and as a result, agree to outcomes or proc-
esses that the state would not have agreed to in the absence of
these agency costs.59
Furthermore, relying on negotiators in Geneva compounds
these agency costs as the physical distance, time spent away from
capitals, and greater possibility for forms of group think, can lead
to a divergence between the values and positions of the trade nego-
tiators and the desires of their principals. 60 Alternatively, the reli-
ance on information that capitals may place on negotiations that
occur in another time, place, and forum, or a lack of trade policy
expertise, can lead politicians to adopt views that are more extreme
and therefore less likely to be in their state's best interest.61
3.2. Was State Consent to the WTO Agreements Freely Given?
To the extent that state consent is coerced, then the legitimating
nature of state consent is reduced. According to article 52 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state consent is vitiated
when procured by the threat or use of force. 62 One way of under-
standing this exception to state consent is as an expression of the
underlying principle that consent needs to be freely given in order
to binding. Therefore, while article 52 only refers to the threat or
use of force, in principle any form of coercion reduces the norma-
tive quality of state consent.
59 See id. at 83 (explaining how working relationships created over time may
cause agents to act differently in making delegated decisions than would princi-
pals if they had full information in the circumstances).
60 See Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L. J. 71, 75 (2000), (noting that "when like-minded people are participating in 'iter-
ated polarization games'-when they meet regularly, without sustained exposure
to competing views -extreme movements are all the more likely").
61 See id. at 82-84 (noting that the risk of such problems is created by "informa-
tional cascades" caused when government officials or legislators lack sufficient
information to make their own decisions, and therefore are forced to rely heavily
on the judgment of negotiators in Geneva).
62 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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One of the arguments leveled against the WTO is that negotia-
tions were undertaken against a backdrop of threats of unilateral
action by the United States under section 301, and that certain
WTO agreements, particularly the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), were only en-
tered into to avoid such action.63 While a threat of unilateral trade
sanctions is quantitatively different from a threat of force, it is
qualitatively similar. This is because under a threat of such action
we can no longer reasonably conclude that states' consent to the
WTO agreements was freely given.
However, control by the United States (or any state) of the flow
of goods and services across its borders is an exercise of its sover-
eignty. Due to the size of the U.S. economy, such control has eco-
nomic repercussions for many states. This does not necessarily
make such action illegal.64 Nevertheless, the question still remains
whether a threat of trade sanctions undermined the legitimating
nature of state consent.
One response is that conditioning trade measures on another
country adopting certain policies is coercion. In Shrimp-Turtle, the
Appellate Body found that in order to avoid a finding that the
United States' application of its measures constituted "unjustifiable
discrimination" under the chapeau of Article XX of GATT, the
United States had an obligation to treat all affected states the same.
In that case it meant that the United States had an obligation to en-
ter into similar negotiations with the complainants as it had with
the Caribbean states. 65 While the Appellate Body's decision did
not create a legal duty to negotiate, the emphasis of its ruling was
on the need for flexibility -the need to take into account different
63 See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 194 (2002) (explaining that many states had no
alternatives to entering into such agreements with the United States); Peter
Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory - TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32
CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L. 357, 368 (2002) (suggesting a "coercion" story, explaining
that many developing countries ultimately agreed to TRIPS not because they
thought they could gain from intellectual property, but because of their interest in
access to the United States market).
64 See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 29 (observing that, "there is, also, no escape
from consent that is induced by economic pressures or unequal bargaining
power").
65 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 168-169; see also Appellate Body Report,
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 25,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline] (finding a vio-
lation of GATT Article XX chapeau because the United States had not attempted to
cooperate with Venezuela).
[Vol. 26:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss4/3
2005] STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND WTO LEGITIMACY 709
conditions in different countries.66
Adopting this framework, it can be argued that during the
Uruguay round, the United States did take into account the condi-
tions and demands of other states by entering into negotiations
with other states, instead of unilaterally applying section 301
rules.67 As a result, while it is undoubtedly true that states under-
stood that failure to conclude the Uruguay round would have led
to increased reliance by the United States on section 301, the WTO
agreements cannot only be understood as a pareto optimal out-
come for the United States (and other economically large states).
Instead, the WTO is better understood as representing a greater
balance of all member states' values and interests than would have
occurred in the absence of the WTO.68
Notwithstanding the absence of formal equality in the bargain-
ing process during the past and current negotiating rounds, if we
assess the opportunities for states during these rounds against the
situation that would have otherwise existed, we can conclude that
the Uruguay round provided a context for negotiations which al-
lowed even the least powerful (and therefore de facto less sover-
eign) states to have their interests represented and taken into ac-
count.
There are however, limits to this argument. Negotiations occur
because states are not bound to an international rule to which they
have not expressed their consent. Negotiations are therefore a re-
sponse to a state's Legal Sovereignty. However, though this Arti-
cle argues that any assessment of the WTO's legitimacy needs to
take into account the different levels of sovereignty that states in
fact possess, when states' exercise of their power during the nego-
66 Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Furtle Case: A New
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 491, 507
(2002).
67 See GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS 51-52 (2003) (observing that
because Section 301 should be understood not only as a unilateral measure but
also as a process of public-private fact gathering and a means to pressure foreign
governments, that "overall, countries' acceptance of a more legalized WTO dis-
pute settlement system has both facilitated and constrained Section 301's use"); see
also Panel Report, United States--Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 8.1,
WT/DS152/R, (Jan. 27, 2000) (finding a promise from the U.S. not to take action
under Section 301 without first having exhausted WTO procedures).
68 See Howse, supra note 19, at 360 (arguing that "one can discern in the rules
consented to a balance of values and interests that might not have been present
had the law simply been imposed unilaterally," but conceding that "but for the
threat of unilateralism, 'consensual' rules would probably have been much less
favorable to the interests of some powerful countries").
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tiations creates too great a divergence from the theory of state
equality, sovereignty is undermined as a basis for assessing the
Appellate Body's legitimacy.69 Consent loses some of its ability to
legitimate the WTO agreements.
3.3. The Circular Reasoning of State Consent
One final problem with state consent is that while it can explain
the process by which states assume international legal obligations,
it cannot answer the question why states must comply with their
obligations. 70 One answer is to point to another principle that is
independent of consent, such as pacta sunt servanda- the rule that
treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good
faith.7' This principle, however, also relies on states consent, leav-
ing us with circular reasoning. In other words, consent itself is un-
able to provide a reason why states should not be able to change
their minds.
72
As Robert Howse has observed, there are other reasons for
complying with WTO rules, such as the economic benefits of liber-
alized trade, or to point to the role of the WTO in avoiding the beg-
gar-thy-neighbor protectionism that helped create the environment
which made World War Two possible.73 Nevertheless, it remains
the case that state consent alone cannot adequately explain why
69 For example, WTO negotiations are often undertaken by small groups of
states (such as the "Quad," which is comprised of the United States, Japan, the
European Community, and Canada), with the outcome presented to the other
member states for their ratification. See generally Understanding the WTO: Mem-
bership, Alliances, and Bureaucracy, www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/
tif-e/org3_e.htm (discussing the membership and role of the "Quad"). This proc-
ess limits the amount of meaningful input from the rest of the WTO membership.
70 See Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International
Law-Making, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 33 (1988) (observing "that [state] will is
only an explanation for one part of the process, ie [sic], the entry into a treaty. It
does not explain the basis of a state's obligation when that state is no longer will-
ing to implement a treaty").
71 Joyeeta Gupta, Legitimacy in the Real World: A Case Study of the Developing
Countries, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Climate Change, in THE LEGITIMACY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 482, 507 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heis-
kanen eds., 2001).
72 LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-
SUPERPOWER WORLD 93 (1994); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 187 (1990) (explaining that contractual obligations,
much like treaties, are not made binding by "the mere agreement of the parties").
73 See generally Howse, supra note 19, at 363 (discussing the effect WTO rules
have on the behavior of individual states with regard to their own processes and
industries).
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states should comply with their WTO obligations.
4. STATE CONSENT AND LEGITIMATE APPELLATE BODY RULINGS
4.1. Attention to the Text
To the extent that the legitimacy of the WTO is derived from
member state consent, the text of the WTO agreements captures
this consent,74 suggesting that the Appellate Body should adopt a
strict textual reading of the WTO agreements. 75 The text is also the
document on which the Appellate Body is constituted. However,
as one commentator has observed, "[t]he [Appellate Body], inexo-
rably, faces profound interpretative choices, often on the basis of a
text which is strikingly vague. A commitment to textual fidelity
will not buy interpretative peace of mind."76 In other words, in
many cases, the text can only take the Appellate Body so far. In
these cases, the Appellate Body needs to look to other sources to
give its decisions legitimacy.
Article 3.2 of the DSU outlines the goals and limits of Appellate
Body interpretations. 77 The first interpretative parameter is that
"[m]embers recognize that [the DSU] serves to preserve the rights
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law." 78 The second parameter is that "[rlecommendations and rul-
ings of the [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish
74 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621
(1990) (noting that "the meaning of a text critically depends upon its surrounding
context," including its legislative history).
75 But see Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in In-
ternational Trade Law, in THE EU, NAFTA AND THE WTO: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 52, 53 J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2001) (arguing that panel deci-
sions under the GATT have paid little attention to text).
76 Joanne Scott, International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules
(and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 307, 311 (2004).
77 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 564 (2001) (stating that DSU article 3.2 "deal[s]
with the inherent limits a WTO panel must observe in interpreting WTO covered
agreements").
78 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, art. 3.2 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
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the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
79
One of the reasons that the Appellate Body has often attempted
to ground its decisions in the text of the WTO agreements is be-
cause this interpretative approach is most likely to satisfy article
3.2 of the DSU. This is because findings that at least appear to be
only an application of the text are most likely to be considered
clarifications of the agreements, and not to be adding to or dimin-
ishing the rights and obligations of member states.
80
However, the vagueness and ambiguities in the text of the
WTO agreements means that the question remains as to how the
Appellate Body can interpret the text in a manner consistent with
state consent as a source of formal legitimacy. The first point is
that consistent with article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the Appel-
late Body can look to the intentions of the negotiators as a supple-
mentary means of interpretation when the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31 of the Vienna Convention is ambigu-
ous, obscure, or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable re-
sult.
Besides references to the dictionary,81 the Appellate Body has
used various interpretative rules to guide its interpretations of the
text. For example, the Appellate Body has made it clear that the
rules of interpretation of public international law include articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.8 2 While the Vienna Conven-
tion is a treaty extrinsic to the WTO agreements, its legitimacy as a
guide for interpreting the WTO agreements is derived from the
words of article 3.2 of the DSU. This suggests that extrinsic materi-
als can be used to interpret the WTO agreements when they are re-
ferred to in the text of the WTO agreements.
8 3
Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention states that "a treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
79 DSU art. 3.2.
80 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the VTO Appellate Body, 38 TEx.
INT'L L. J. 469, 480-81 (2003).
81 Id. at 480.
82 Id.; see also Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 65, at 17 (stating that article 31
"has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law").
83 See Howse, supra note 66, at 507-08 (noting that the Appellate Body has in
the past claimed justification under the Preamble of the WTO Agreement for us-
ing international environmental law to define a term in the GATT); Pauwelyn, su-
pra note 77, at 554-555 (explaining that certain "WTO rules do not incorporate
non-WTO rules but do refer to them explicitly. In this way these non-WTO rules
can become part of a WTO claim").
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light of its object and purpose." 84 This reinforces the text of the
treaty as the starting place for an interpretative process. However,
it also means that interpretations cannot be made in a vacuum but
need to be made in light of the WTO agreement's object and pur-
pose.85 As will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5, the Ap-
pellate Body has "eschewed teleological interpretations based on a
general goal of promoting trade liberalization" and instead contin-
ues to endorse only specific textually supported goals to justify its
decisions.86
While the Appellate Body has endorsed the Vienna Convention
rules of treaty interpretation, it has also observed that "these prin-
ciples of interpretation [in the Vienna Convention] neither require
nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not
there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not in-
tended."87 The Appellate Body has also stated that "it is certainly
not the task of either panels or the Appellate Body to amend the
DSU," and that "[o]nly WTO Members have the authority to
amend the DSU." 88
Consistent with this approach, the Appellate Body has over-
ruled numerous panel decisions on the grounds that they were not
based on the text. For example, in Shrimp-Turtle the Appellate
Body overruled the panel's interpretation of Article XX of GATT
on the grounds that "the panel did not expressly examine the ordi-
nary meaning of the words of Article XX,"89 and instead based its
interpretation on "a standard or a test that finds no basis either in
84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 63, art. 31.1.
85 See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Consti-
tutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 261 (2004) (stating that "[slo
much weight can be placed on ordinary meaning that object, purpose, context,
and negotiating history are ignored. In such cases, failure to give weight to non-
textual factors could lead to interpretations that contradict what the negotiators
manifestly intended, effectively contradicting the fundamental principle of treaty
law - state consent - and risking political repercussions").
86 John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Envi-
ronment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004); see also Ehlermann, supra note 80, at
480 (2003) (noting that article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention calls for treaties to
"be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose").
87 Appellate Body Report, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products, 45, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
88 Appellate Body Report, United States -Import Measures on Certain Products
from the European Communities, 92, WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
89 Shrimp-Turtle, supra 53, 115.
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the text of the chapeau or in that of either of the two specific excep-
tions claimed by the United States." 90
In its report Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos -Containing
Products ("Asbestos"), the Appellate Body overturned the panel's
exclusion of evidence of health risks from the Article III of GATT
analysis of "'likeness of products" on the grounds that there was
no basis in the text for the exclusion of this evidence. 91 In its report
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products ("Hormones"), the Ap-
pellate Body was also forced to overturn a panel ruling on article 3
of the SPS Agreement because the panel failed to pay attention to
the implications of the differences between the phrases "based on"
in article 3.1 and "conform to" in article 3.2.92
This is only a sample of cases where the Appellate Body has
overturned panel decisions because of the panel's failure to pay at-
tention to the text of the agreements. However, these cases reveal
that, despite the Appellate Body's rhetoric of a textual interpreta-
tion, a closer analysis reveals that its decisions are based on sources
other than the text.
For example, in Asbestos, the deficiency in the panel's decision
was largely procedural, in that they had excluded evidence from
its analysis and therefore failed to evaluate all the relevant evi-
dence. 93 Even after considering all the evidence that the panel
failed to consider in its analysis, it was still open for the Appellate
Body to reach the same decision as the panel. Instead, this decision
reveals a form of deference to member states; by recognizing that
the health risk of a product can inform an analysis of whether it is a
"like product" under Article III of GATT, the Appellate Body pro-
vided member states with increased scope for distinguishing be-
tween domestic and imported products in ways that are consistent
with their national treatment obligations under GATT.
Further, while the Appellate Body's ruling in Hormones -that
the panel failed to pay attention to the different phrases in articles
3.1 and 3.2-was based on the text, the text did not define these dif-
ferences. Instead, the Appellate Body relied upon both the "object
90 Id. 121.
91 Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, 113, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [herein-
after Asbestos].
92 Appellate Body Report, European Communities -Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), 164, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Hormones].
93 Asbestos, supra note 91, 113.
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and purpose" of article 3, combined with an appeal to the need to
adopt an interpretation that accorded deference to member states.
94
These cases raise the question as to what extent the reference to
the object and purpose of the WTO agreements is legitimate, and
will be discussed in more detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. This still
leaves open the question of the legitimacy of deference as an inter-
pretative guide.
4.2. Deference
Deference as traditionally understood is captured in the inter-
pretative principles of in dubio mitius. As noted above, this princi-
ple was explicitly relied upon by the Appellate Body in the Hor-
mones case to overturn the panel's interpretation of the SPS
Agreement article 3.1 phrase "based on" as creating an obligation
to use international standards. In that case the Appellate Body de-
scribed the principle as meaning that "[w]e cannot lightly assume
that sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the more
onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation by mandating
conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines, and rec-
ommendations."95
One of the problems with deference as an interpretative princi-
ple is that its legitimacy is derived not from the text but solely from
what one commentator has described as "an uncritical and un-
qualified deference to sovereignty." 96 This highlights not only the
absence of any textual basis, but also that an understanding of sov-
ereignty that requires Appellate Body deference to member states
ignores how membership in the WTO can reinforce a state's sover-
eignty.
There is, however, another more limited form of deference that
has informed Appellate Body interpretations and which avoids in-
terpretations that merely seek to limit the disciplines of the WTO
agreements. This form of deference recognizes the right of mem-
ber states to set their own level of protection. The Appellate Body
has applied such deference when it has recognized the right of a
member state to "determine its own appropriate level of sanitary
94 Hormones, supra note 92, 165.
95Id.
96 Layla A. Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The
WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormones Decision, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 915, 921
(1998).
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protection," 97 and in the context of Article XX of GATT, it has been
referred to as the undisputed right of member states to "determine
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a
given situation." 98
These findings by the Appellate Body also have limited
grounding in the text of the WTO agreements.99 Yet, the type of
freedom of action that is being recognized here is deference to the
policy options of states. 00 This is distinct from deference to the
types of measures member states adopt and how these measures
are implemented in order to achieve their policy choices. The for-
mer type of deference does not undermine the sovereignty-
enhancing role of the WTO because it is based on the argument
that the right of member states to set a level of risk was never in-
tended to be disciplined by the WTO agreements. Further, the
choice by a member state of a level of risk does not implicate other
member states' sovereignty.
Finally, in recent cases the Appellate Body has used a textual
justification to interpret WTO obligations in ways that reduce the
regulatory autonomy of member states. For example, in the Condi-
tions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries case
("GSP"), the Appellate Body found that the reference in footnote 3
of the Enabling Clause to GSP preferences that are non-
97 Hormones, supra note 92, 172; see also Steve Chamovitz, Commentary,
Internet Roundtable: The Appellate Body's GSP Decision, 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 239,
241 (2004) (arguing that "the WTO treaty does not accord substantive rights to
Members, and could not possibly do so. Rather, what the WTO treaty does is to
convey substantive obligations"). This suggests that the Appellate Body in Hor-
mones is not according members a right but instead recognizing that WTO rules
do not determine the level of protection a member state can choose.
98 Asbestos, supra note 91, 168.
99 See Hormones, supra note 92, 172 (referring to the sixth preamble which
supports member states' right to choose their own level of protection).
100 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in W[TO
Law, 7 J. INT'L EcON. L. 491, 517 (2004) (describing deference accorded states on
policy choices in adoption of SPS measures). The argument that the WTO does
not constrain the right of member states to choose their own level of protection is
not without some uncertainty. See, e.g. Hormones, supra note 92, 173 (stating that
"[tihe right of a Member to define its appropriate level of protection is not, how-
ever, an absolute or unqualified right."); see also Henrik Horn & Joseph Weiler,
Textualism and its Discontents, in THE PRINCIPLES OF WORLD TRADE LAW: THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 25, 30 (2003) (noting that the only test of whether an
international standard is effective or appropriate that can sustain the argument
that "the TBT is not meant to affect the level of protection or risk as member may
adopt" is one derived from consumer behavior).
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discriminatory created a legal obligation.101 Commentators have
nevertheless pointed out that "donor states never accepted that
their ability to modify or withdraw GSP preferences would be sub-
ject to such a 'hard' legal constraint." 10 2 In the Sardines case, the
Appellate Body also used a textual analysis to support its finding
that international standards do not have to be adopted by consen-
sus in order to be part of the TBT Agreement.103 Further, despite
article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement containing a spe-
cific deferential standard of judicial review, compared with article
11 of the DSU "the existence of the article 17.6(ii) standard has had
no perceptible impact on WTO review of national anti-dumping
actions."104
These cases raise other issues, namely the extent that the text
can justify these decisions or whether they can be justified on other
grounds. The Sardines case will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4. It suffices to note here that in contrast to defer-
ence, Appellate Body decisions that strengthen WTO obligations
may claim some legitimacy from an understanding of the WTO as
capable of reinforcing member state sovereignty.
4.3. Exceptions and the Burden of Proof
"Burden of proof" refers to whether the complainant or the de-
fendant is required to produce evidence to either prove or refute a
claim. The Appellate Body report in Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India described the general rule regarding the assignment of
the burden of proof as follows:
[Tihe burden of proof rests upon the party, whether com-
plaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a par-
101 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 147, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter GSP].
102 Charnovitz, supra note 97, at 249; Robert Howse, Commentary, in Internet
Roundtable: The Appellate Body's GSP Decision, supra note 98, at 246 & 249 (2004);
see also Robert Howse, India's VVTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the
European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Ma-
jor Repercussions for "Political" Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L.
385, 393 (2003) (arguing that "the idea of non-discrimination in the description of
the GSP has a largely, though not entirely, aspirational legal effect").
103 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Trade Description of Sar-
dines, 219-227, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Sardines].
104 Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: TO
Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 109, 147
(2002).
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ticular claim or defense. If that party adduces evidence suf-
ficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true,
the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail
unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presump-
tion.10
5
Therefore, a decision when to shift the burden of proof from
the complainant to the defendant can be a proxy for deference to
member states. 0 6 This is because it is assumed that the party not
under the burden of proof is not in breach of its WTO obligations
until a prima facie case has been established.
The significance of the decision of where to allocate the burden
of proof raises the question of how this determination is to be le-
gitimately made. The formulation contained in Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses from India indicates that the burden shifts when the de-
fendant seeks to affirm a particular claim or defense. However, it
is not always clear when a WTO obligation becomes an exception
that requires the burden of proof to shift to the defending state.
In Hormones, the Appellate Body stated that the general rule re-
quiring the complaining party to establish a prima facie case of in-
consistency "is not avoided by simply describing that same provi-
sion as an 'exception."' 107 This suggests that the Appellate Body is
emphasizing substance over form and can mean that it is attention
to the text that counts. However, Appellate Body cases indicate
that considerations other than the text will take a leading role in
determining when an exception arises.
Article XX of GATT is headed "General Exceptions," and the
Appellate Body has made it clear that while the complaining
member state bears the burden of establishing a breach of the obli-
gations contained in Articles I, III, and XI of GATT, the burden
then shifts to the defending state when they wish to rely on the Ar-
ticle XX exceptions. 108 In the GSP case, a similar rule-exception re-
lationship was also found to exist between Article I of GATT and
105 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India].
106 See Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law, 38
J. WORLD TRADE 1, 32 (2004) (arguing that the better tool to accord deference is the
standard of review).
107 Hormones, supra note 92, 104.
108 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 65, at 22; accord Shrimp-Turtle, supra note
53, 34.
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the Enabling Clause,109 though the Appellate Body drew a distinc-
tion between those exceptions that the defendant had to raise and
prove, and those that the complainant had to raise and the defen-
dant prove." 0
The approach of the Appellate Body to the SPS Agreement and
the TBT Agreement has been considerably less straightforward.
This is because while the panel in Hormones found that articles 3.1
and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement created a similar rule-exception rela-
tionship, this finding was overturned by the Appellate Body. 1'
One of the grounds for this was that the relationship between arti-
cles 3.1 and 3.3 was "qualitatively different" from the relationship
between Articles I, III, and XX of GATT. Little guidance was given
by the Appellate Body as to what this difference consists of except
to note that "article 3.3 recognizes the autonomous right of a Mem-
ber to establish [a] higher level of protection."
1 12
In Sardines, the Appellate Body also overturned the panel's rul-
ing that article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement contained a rule-
exception relationship."13 The Appellate Body found that the strong
conceptual similarities between article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
and articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement meant that the panel
should have applied the Appellate Body's reasoning in Hor-
mones." 4 This meant that the burden remained on Peru, the com-
plainant, to establish that Codex standards were "effective and ap-
propriate" to fulfill the legitimate objectives of the EC.115 This
approach by the Appellate Body has made it more difficult to es-
tablish a prima facie breach of the TBT and SPS Agreements.
The problem that the Appellate Body has had in tying these de-
cisions to the text was revealed in the Sardines case. The decision
by the Appellate Body that article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement did
not contain an exception meant that the Appellate Body imposed
upon Peru the obligation of establishing whether the international
standards were "effective and appropriate." In contrast, article 2.4
of the TBT Agreement states that members are to use technical
regulations except when such international standards or relevant
109 GSP, supra note 101, 99.
110 Id. 110-115.
111 Hormones, supra note 92, 106.
112 Id. 104.
113 Sardines, supra note 103, 282.
114 Id. 274.
115 Id. 275.
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parts would be an "ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfill-
ment of the[ir] legitimate objectives."11 6 The use of the word "ex-
cept" and the obligation to prove a negative-that standards are
ineffective or inappropriate, as distinct from the positive formula-
tion used by the Appellate Body-reveals that the Appellate
Body's decision was not grounded in the text.117
This raises the issue of the legitimacy of the Appellate Body's
departure from the text. As noted in Sardines, the Appellate Body
did not provide any additional insight into what were the qualita-
tive differences between the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement,
and the GATT. One commentator has suggested that the different
approaches of the Appellate Body in GATT cases compared with
the TBT and SPS Agreement cases stems from the "philosophy of
positive harmonization" 1 8 contained in the SPS and TBT Agree-
ment. For example, member states may be in breach of the TBT
and SPS Agreements when they fail to base a regulation on inter-
national standards, even when the impugned regulation is non-
discriminatory. This is in contrast to the GATT, which principally
disciplines member states when they adopt discriminatory regula-
tions.
These differences are reflected in the means employed by the
GATT, which is largely aimed at disciplining measures applied at
the border. In contrast, the TBT and SPS Agreements discipline in-
ternal measures that discriminate against local and foreign goods.
The TBT and SPS Agreements therefore have the potential to sig-
nificantly intrude into member states' regulatory autonomy be-
cause most government regulation has the potential to implicate
international trade. This raises the question of how the Appellate
Body is to distinguish between measures that discriminate against
trade and legitimate measures. While this is a question that is be-
yond the scope of this Article, several observations will be made in
Section 2.4.
The analysis so far suggests that despite claims of the Appellate
Body to the contrary, it was not the text but the different regulatory
functions of the TBT and SPS Agreements compared with the
GATT that caused the Appellate Body to find that these agree-
ments did not contain rule-exception relationships.
This naturally raises the question of the legitimacy of the Ap-
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 Heiskanen, supra note 106, at 30.
118 Id. at 9-10.
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pellate Body's approach. One possible source of legitimacy for the
Appellate Body's approach is article 31.1 of the Vienna Conven-
tion. As discussed, article 31.1 makes it legitimate to take into ac-
count, along with the text, the object and purpose of the treaty. It
has been shown that the TBT and SPS Agreements are significantly
different than the GATT. This suggests that legitimate Appellate
Body interpretations of the TBT and SPS Agreements not only can
take into account these differences in their interpretation of articles
2.4 and 3 (which is arguably what that Appellate Body did), but
that the Appellate Body is required to take these differences into
account.119
This ruling undercuts the article 2.5 encouragement in the TBT
Agreement for member states to adopt regulations that are in ac-
cordance with relevant international standards and potentially re-
duces the role of international standards and the WTO as a means
for distinguishing between legitimate and discriminatory meas-
ures. Additionally, the ruling makes it less likely that a state will
be found in violation of the TBT Agreement for not using interna-
tional standards, thereby reducing the incentive to use them in the
first instance. On the other hand, member states are given greater
freedom to adopt regulations that do not use international stan-
dards.
In Sardines, the Appellate Body also interpreted the reference in
article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement to international standards and the
explanatory note to the term "standard" in annex I of the TBT
Agreement to include international standards that are not devel-
oped by consensus. 120 It is unclear from the explanatory note
whether "standards" encompasses non-consensually agreed inter-
national standards. Therefore, the unclear and ambiguous lan-
guage in annex I means that the text can only provide the Appel-
late Body's interpretations with a limited amount of legitimacy. 121
Any assessment of the legitimacy of its decision, however,
should be made in light of its approach to the burden of proof de-
119 See Henrik Horn and Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Communities -Trade
Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontents, Discussion Paper prepared
for the American Law Institute Project, 'The Principles of World Trade Law: The
World Trade Organization,' November 25, 2003; see also id. at 5-7 (arguing that
taking into account the object and purpose is not going beyond the text but is in-
stead part of a sophisticated hermeneutics).
120 Sardines, supra note 103, 222-27.
121Id. 219-27 (upholding the panel's interpretation against the European
Communities' argument).
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scribed above. On its face, the result of the decision is that a rele-
vant international standard may be one that is not adopted by con-
sensus, thus opening up the WTO to a wider range of applicable
international standards. This appears to undermine the argument
that the Appellate Body was being sensitive to the need for mem-
ber states to have flexibility in deciding whether to use interna-
tional standards. It also means that a member state may be in
breach of article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement when it does not use an
international standard as a basis for its regulations, whether or not
that member state has consented to the international standard,
thereby undermining the state's Legal Sovereignty. States' West-
phalian Sovereignty is also undermined to the extent that interna-
tional standards are imposed on them through the WTO.
However, if we consider Sardines' effect on the horizontal rela-
tionships between states, then the Appellate Body's decision can be
understood as reinforcing states' Westphalian Sovereignty because
it strengthens smaller states in international standard-setting bod-
ies. This conclusion is based on the following observations. The
first is that states such as the EU and the United States, due to their
economic size, can effectively require states to comply with their
own domestic standards in order to import into their territory.
These states therefore have less need for international standards
organizations. But these organizations are the most effective
means for most other states to affect the creation of international.
standards. This suggests that, where standards are voted by con-
sensus, larger standard-setting states will use their vetoes more of-
ten than standard-takers will use their vetoes.122 This is because
standard-setters have an alternative to international standards or-
ganizations, namely the unilateral development of international
standards. Further, the fact that international standards are made
enforceable via the TBT and SPS Agreements provides added in-
centives for larger states to bypass international standards organi-
zations and establish standards unilaterally.
By incorporating into the TBT Agreement standards not
adopted by consensus, the Appellate Body ruling creates an incen-
tive for most states to engage seriously in international standards
organizations. To the extent this observation proves true, this rul-
122 See Charnovitz, supra note 34, at 13 (arguing that standards developed uni-
laterally rather than by international standards organizations may be designed to
enhance the competitiveness of their domestic producers more than technical and
scientific goals).
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ing will strengthen many member state's Westphalian Sovereignty
by reducing the unilateral development of standards.1
23
In addition, we now see that the burden of proof issue cuts
both ways. By making it less easy to find a violation of article 2.4
of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body made it more difficult
to establish a prima facie violation of the TBT Agreement. As noted,
this form of deference can be justified by the more intrusive regula-
tion of member states' measures that occurs under the TBT Agree-
ment than under the GATT. The Sardines decision also means that
a greater range of standards (i.e., consensual and non-consensual)
is incorporated into the TBT Agreement. This means that once a
prima facie violation has been established, the Appellate Body has a
greater range of standards available to help it distinguish between
legitimate and discriminatory measures.
The practical effect is that the Appellate Body appears keen to
avoid, at least explicitly, drawing the line between those internal
measures that are legitimate and should be allowed, and those
measures that the TBT Agreement should condemn. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to determine the legitimacy of its ap-
proach, but the following issues should be noted. The first and
most significant problem is that the decision in Sardines (that inter-
national standards include those not adopted by consensus) raises
significant sovereignty issues. Further, the interpretation of article
2.4 of the TBT Agreement gains limited legitimacy from its atten-
tion to the text. It therefore remains to be seen whether these le-
gitimacy concerns will be outweighed by the reduced likelihood
that a member state will be found to violate the TBT or SPS
Agreement, and by the role of international standards in determin-
ing whether a measure violates the TBT Agreement.
Finally, an alternative approach that avoids some of these sig-
nificant sovereignty issues would be to read annex I of the TBT
Agreement as referring only to international standards adopted by
consensus, while finding that article 2.4 contains a rule-exception
123 This is not to suggest that even under consensus voting rules the outcomes
in international standards organizations are necessarily free of the influence of
powerful states. See Slaughter, supra note 4, at 292 (discussing how powerful
states can set the agenda). However, it is argued that the outcomes achieved in
these bodies undermine weaker states' Westphalian and Legal Sovereignty to a
lesser extent than would be the case if powerful states developed standards uni-
laterally. See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 333 (demonstrating that states' sovereign
equality is putatively observed in international organizations, but powerful states
can drive outcomes in these settings by setting agendas and using sources of
power extrinsic to decisionmaking procedures).
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relationship. There is certainly room for this approach in the text
of TBT annex I. This approach would also give meaning to article
2.5, itself an interpretative approach advocated by the Appellate
Body.124
Also, to the extent that the Appellate Body should take into ac-
count the differences between the TBT and SPS Agreements, a
more appropriate tool than the allocation of the burden of proof
may be the standard of judicial review.125 The standard of judicial
review refers to the level of Appellate Body scrutiny that will be
applied to a member state's measure, and therefore "plays a central
role in defining the powers of national authorities in the trade
field." 126 Different standards of review are already being used in
the GATT; the Appellate Body applies a stricter review to meas-
ures that seek justification as being "necessary" under Article
XX(b) of GATT, than to measures that are claimed to "relat[e] to"
under Article XX(g) of GATT. 127
In the case of article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, this could pro-
vide that the phrase "as a basis" is interpreted to require a less
stringent rational relationship between the member state's regula-
tion and the international standard, thereby making it difficult for
the complaining state to establish a prima facie violation of article
2.4. Alternatively, the Appellate Body could apply a less deferen-
tial standard when determining whether the international standard
was ineffective or inappropriate for achieving the member states'
legitimate objectives. 128
4.5. Legitimacy and the Appellate Body's Use of Public International
Law
The Appellate Body's use of public international law has been
grounded in its incorporation through article 3.2 of the DSU and its
124 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 121 (stating that a treaty interpreter can-
not adopt an interpretation that would render the text superfluous).
125 See Heiskanen, supra note 106, at 32 (exploring the role and operation of
standards of review in WTO law).
126 Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 100, at 491.
127 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 65, at 17-18.
128 See Jacqueline Peel, Risk Regulation Under the WTO SPS Agreement: Science
as an International Normative Yardstick 73 Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/04,
2004), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040201.pdf
(noting that "WTO decision-makers in SPS cases do not adopt a deferential stance
in reviewing the scientific basis of national SPS measures," but that the "[s]cope
for deference to operate through a strategic allocation of the burden of proof is
also very limited").
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reference to article 31 of the Vienna Convention. In particular, arti-
cle 31.3 of the Vienna Convention refers to the use of other sources
of public international law in the interpretative process.
Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention 29 states that:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regard-
ing the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
This Article focuses on article 31.3 because of its relevance to
the use of international rules and particularly treaty law. As can be
seen, article 31.3 is not a model of clarity. For example, it is unclear
whether the reference to "parties" means parties to the WTO
agreement or parties to other rules of international law, and if the
latter, whether all WTO members or just the members involved in
the dispute need to be parties to the rule of international law.
As a result of this ambiguity, the scope that these rules of inter-
pretation give to the Appellate Body to consider other rules of pub-
lic international law remains hotly contested. To the extent that
consent is a source of legitimacy for Appellate Body rulings, article
31.3 provides a textual basis for using other rules of public interna-
tional law to interpret the WTO agreements. 130
In addition to this textual basis, the Appellate Body often
merely incorporates other international law that has been con-
sented to by states.' 3' However, this is not the case when the Ap-
pellate Body is asked to apply customary international law. The
129 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, supra note 62, art. 31.3.
130 See Knox, supra note 86, at 55-56 (noting that "in Shrimp-Turtle I, the Ap-
pellate Body appeared to rely primarily on an extratextual principle").
131 See Scott, supra note 76, at 311 (observing that "the [Appellate Body] might
adopt a more 'forgiving' approach to trade restrictions adopted pursuant to a
multilateral envirohmental regime ... even where the party against which the re-
striction is imposed is not a party to the environmental agreement in question,
and hence has not consented to it").
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Appellate Body appeared to be aware of this issue when in Hor-
mones it refused to decide whether the precautionary principle had
become a principle of customary international law.
132
One of the problems with the use of sources of law extrinsic to
the WTO agreements is that the absence of binding dispute settle-
ment in other treaty regimes suggests that states never intended
that these rules be interpreted by a binding dispute settlement
body or bootstrapped into the WTO's enforcement mechanisms.
133
Another difficulty with relying too heavily on article 3.2 of the
DSU and the Vienna Convention as a textual basis for using public
international law is that, as discussed above, the Vienna Conven-
tion article 31.1 is unclear as to when other rules of public interna-
tional law can be relied upon by the Appellate Body.
These problems may partly explain why the Appellate Body,
despite ruling that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are
incorporated into the WTO agreement via article 3.2 of the DSU,
has rarely used these articles to justify relying on other rules of
public international law. For example, despite the use by the Ap-
pellate Body of public international law sources such as the ICJ's
Namibia (legal consequences) Advisory Opinion, the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), and other
principles of international environmental law to interpret the word
"exhaustible" in Article XX(g) of GATT as including living and
non-living resources,134 no mention is made of the Vienna Conven-
tion as a basis for its interpretative approach. The failure of the
Appellate Body to use the Vienna Convention to justify its decision
in terms of the undermines the legitimacy of its interpretation, de-
spite the uncertainties discussed above.
The Appellate Body has also relied upon extrinsic sources of
public international law as examples of fact.135 As John Knox has
132 See Hormones, supra note 92, 123 (noting that the Appellate Body decided
not to take a position on the status of the precautionary principle in international
law).
133 See Pauwelyn, supra note 77, at 560 (advocating the approach that draws a
distinction between using public international law rules to interpret WTO agree-
ments and applying these rules, and also limiting the applicability of public inter-
national law rules to defenses asserted by member states in WTO disputes,
thereby keeping the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism from enforcing non-
WTO obligations).
134 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 130 (noting that many modem intema-
tional conventions and declarations frequently refer to "natural resources as em-
bracing both living and non-living resources").
135 See Howse, supra note 66, at 506 (noting the Appellate Body's reliance on
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pointed out, in the case of multilateral environmental agreements,
these reflect a politically acceptable balance between trade liberali-
zation and environmental protection.136 For example, in Shrimp-
Turtle, the Appellate Body noted that the Inter-American Conven-
tion read in light of member states WTO obligations demonstrated
that "consensual and multilateral procedures are available and fea-
sible for the establishment of programs for the conservation of sea
turtles."'137
The Appellate Body also referred to the listing of turtles in Ap-
pendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora138 as demonstrating the turtles are
"exhaustible" within the meaning of GATT Article XX(g). 139 Fur-
ther, in the GSP case, the Appellate Body found that the require-
ment in the Enabling Clause that a developing country have "de-
velopment, financial or trade need[s]" can be determined by
reference to multilateral instruments adopted by international or-
ganizations. 140 In this case, the Appellate Body used multilateral
instruments as indicators of fact, and not as sources of legal obliga-
tion.
The legitimacy of this approach is largely derived from its lack
of illegitimacy. In particular, the Appellate Body's factual use of
other international law means that it is not changing member
states' WTO rights and obligations and therefore respecting the pa-
rameters set by article 3.2 of the DSU. To the extent that these in-
ternational agreements do reflect political compromises, references
to them by the Appellate Body may also contribute to decisions
that are more consistent with the norms of the international sys-
tem. The extent to which this contributes to the stability of the
trading system can be seen to be a goal of the WTO. However, as
will be discussed in more detail in Section 5, infra, the stability of
the trading system is too broad a goal to provide much legitimacy
the agreement embodied in the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles); Pauwelyn, supra note 77, at 572 (noting that non-
WTO rules that have been ratified by a significant number of WTO members may
affect the Appellate Body's interpretation of WTO agreements).
136 Knox, supra note 86, at 58.
137 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 170.
138 Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
139 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 132 (arguing that the list in Appendix 1 of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora includes all species threatened with extinction).
140 GSP, supra note 101, 163.
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for Appellate Body decisions.
The Appellate Body's factual use of other rules of public inter-
national law as fact does not implicate states' Legal Sovereignty
because it does not lead to a change in states' legal rights and obli-
gations. Further, if we accept that states enter into multilateral
treaties in order to achieve goals that cannot be achieved by acting
alone, then using these agreements factually in WTO dispute set-
tlement will at a minimum avoid member states' WTO obligations
undermining their ability to achieve other non-trade goals and
thereby reinforce their Interdependence Sovereignty.
5. THE OUTPUT LEGITIMACY OF APPELLATE BODY DECISIONS
Globalization has led to states being affected by decisions and
events that occur beyond their borders. For example, environ-
mental degradation and organized crime often have an interna-
tional dimension. Furthermore, states are also being forced into in-
creasingly complex forms of cooperation with other states and
international organizations in order to deliver the type of govern-
ance expected by their citizens.141
The WTO has always, to some extent, been about increasing the
ability of member states to achieve broadly desired goals. For ex-
ample, the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement refers to the
goals of "raising standards of living, ensuring full employment...
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in ac-
cordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment."
142
Interdependence Sovereignty captures the regulators' desire for
control over "transboundary goods and harms."143 Appellate Body
decisions that are informed by the WTO as a mechanism to enable
member states to achieve goals they would be unable to achieve
acting alone will gain some legitimacy. 44 This also supports the
claim that the legitimacy of the WTO needs to be assessed by com-
paring the sovereignty of states as a result of their membership in
the WTO with their ability to exercise sovereignty absent member-
ship in the WTO. For example, the WTO enhances states' Interde-
141 Bello, supra note 41, at 1030.
142 TBT Agreement, supra note 34, at pmbl.
143 Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 867.
144 See Jackson, supra note 15, at 790 (arguing that sovereignty issues are really
questions about whether "decisions should be made, as a matter of good govern-
mental policy, at the nation-state (U.S.) level, and not at the international level").
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pendence Sovereignty when membership in the WTO enables
states to pursue a broader range of policy options than would oth-
erwise be possible. 145
This raises the question of how the Appellate Body is to legiti-
mately determine the goals of the WTO that can guide its interpre-
tations. It is often argued that membership in the WTO enables
member states to increase their economic welfare.146 According to
international economic theory, unilateral liberalization of a states'
tariffs unambiguously increases national welfare. However, this
economic case for free trade does not therefore explain the need for
reciprocity that characterizes WTO negotiations. 147 A political
economy understanding of trade agreements sheds some light by
taking into account rent-seeking amongst powerful domestic inter-
est groups, and the motives of trade officials to maximize their
own political fortunes. 148 As a result, trade agreements like the
WTO are often pareto optimal in the political rather than in the
economic sense.1
49
As discussed, WTO agreements such as the TBT and SPS
Agreements do not deal with reductions in tariffs and other border
measures, whose elimination is required by the economic case for
free trade. Instead, these Agreements have been described as regu-
latory, as member states have not only agreed to not engage in dis-
crimination against foreigners, but have assumed positive obliga-
tions, such as basing their regulations on risk assessments and
international standards. 50 As a result, member states may be in
145 See Sir Robert Jennings, Sovereignty and International Law, in STATE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 27, 37 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002)
(arguing that the creation of institutions that enable appropriate governmental
functions to be preformed internationally is not so much a limitation on a state's
sovereignty but rather an extension of state governmental power to the interna-
tional plane).
146 Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of
a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 77, 94 (2003); see also PAUL R. KRUGMAN &
MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 218-223 (6th ed. 2003) (providing
economic and political arguments for free trade).
147 Howse, supra note 19, at 365.
148 See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 167, 174 (1999) (arguing that small groups of producers, importers, etc. exer-
cise greater influence on development of international law than domestic law);
Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (arguing that protectionism helps domestic firms at the expense
of foreign firms).
149 Sykes, supra note 148, at 24-26.
150 See generally Heiskanen, supra note 106 (reflecting on the present state of the
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violation of these Agreements without engaging in any form of
discrimination. In these cases, the welfare implications of compli-
ance are uncertain.151
Other WTO agreements such as the Anti-Dumping Agreement
("ADA")152 and TRIPS also have uncertain economic credentials.
For example, the prohibition by the ADA of dumping is often seen
as discouraging price competition. 5 3 Furthermore, the TRIPS
Agreement requires all member states to adopt similar levels of in-
tellectual property protection. Whether or not the level of protec-
tion specified in TRIPS will increase member states' welfare can
only be determined on a case-by-case basis. The emphasis that
TRIPS places on protecting the fruits of innovation as opposed to
access to innovation means that TRIPS "cannot be expected to in-
crease welfare in all countries,"154 and often it will be the less de-
veloped countries, who are more likely to rely on the innovation
from wealthy countries, whose welfare will be reduced.
What this suggests is that while economic theory underpins
unilateral liberalization, the claim that compliance with the WTO is
legitimate because it achieves member states' generally desired
goal of increased economic welfare is too general a statement, too
dependent on the facts of each case, to provide much legitimacy.
This is also true of the other stated role of the WTO -to avoiding
the beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism that provided the condi-
tions for the Second World War. This is undoubtedly a worthwhile
goal. However, it is also too general to provide specific guidance
for legitimate Appellate Body adjudication l 55
The propensity of panels to interpret the WTO agreements in
light of broad goals was addressed by the Appellate Body in the
Shrimp-Turtle case. In that case the panel interpreted Article XX of
GATT in light of the very general goal of not "undermining the
WTO multilateral trading system." 156 The Appellate Body rejected
multilateral trading system).
151 Howse, supra note 19, at 355-56.
152 TBT Agreement, supra note 34.
153 See Tarullo, supra note 104, at 111 (noting the perception by most econo-
mists that anti-dumping laws are misguided because they discourage price com-
petition in some circumstances).
154 Keith E. Maskus, Regulatory Standards in the INTO: Comparing Intellectual
Property Rights with Competition Policy, Environmental Protection, and Core Labor
Standards (Univ. of Colo., Working Paper No. 00-1, 2000).
155 Howse, supra note 19, at 369.
156 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 36.
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this approach because this goal is "not a right or an obligation, nor
is it an interpretative rule."157 Instead, the Appellate Body found
that the panel should have looked into the object and purpose of
the chapeau of Article XX.
158
Shrimp-Turtle suggests that the Appellate Body largely rejects
interpreting the WTO agreements in light of broad goals such as
the maintenance of the trading system, or indeed, economic wel-
fare. As the panel demonstrated, such goals fail to provide any
guidance as to what constitutes a legitimate interpretation other
than the panel's sense of the teleology of the trading system and
what it can bear.159 Instead, the Appellate Body relied on the object
and purpose of specific articles to guide its interpretations.
In the Hormones case, the Appellate Body also relied on the ob-
ject and purpose of the SPS Agreement to support its interpretation
of article 3.3. In that case, the Appellate Body was forced to inter-
pret what it described as the "involved and layered language" of
article 3.3. 160 The Appellate Body was therefore required to forge
meaning from article 3.3 in a way that led it to reading the disjunc-
tive "or" as substantively irrelevant. As a result of this departure
from the text, the Appellate Body also relied on the object and pur-
pose of article 3 of the SPS Agreement to support its conclusion
that the EC was required to have performed an article 5.1 risk as-
sessment. The Appellate Body therefore noted that:
In generalized terms, the object and purpose of ar-
ticle 3 is to promote the harmonization of the SPS
measures of Members on as wide a basis as possible,
while recognizing and safeguarding, at the same
time, the right and duty of Members to protect the
life and health of their people (emphasis added). 161
As discussed above, interpreting the WTO agreements in light
of their object and purpose is mandated by article 31.1 of the Vi-
enna Convention. It has been argued in Section 4.3 supra that the
Appellate Body's decision in Sardines regarding the allocation of
the burden of proof was at least partially justified by the different
157 Id. at T 116.
158 Id. at 116.
159 Howse, supra note 19, at 363.
160 Hormones, supra note 92, 176.
161 Hormones, supra note 92, 177.
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object and purpose of the TBT Agreement compared with the
GATT. At first glance, this suggests that the Appellate Body is
prepared to use a broad understanding of the WTO agreements'
"object and purpose" to guide its interpretations. However, the
decision in Sardines can be distinguished by its outcome, which
was to make it more difficult to establish a violation of article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement. This differs from the approach of the panel in
Shrimp-Turtle, which was to significantly limit the scope of the ex-
ceptions in Article XX of GATT. As a result, the issue that Sardines
raises is more a question of the legitimacy of the Appellate Body's
conception of deference.
I believe that the Appellate Body is correct to rely on the object
and purpose of the WTO agreements, when these are based within
the text. This keeps the Appellate Body from having to justify its
references to objects and purposes that in other treaties. In most
cases, the Appellate Body derives the objects and purposes from a
preamble in a WTO agreement. 162 These preambles are often gen-
erally drafted, and therefore allow the Appellate Body to interpret
the WTO agreements in ways that allow member states to achieve
goals they would be unable to achieve acting alone, while allowing
the Appellate Body to ground its interpretations by reference to the
text.
6. CONCLUSION
The Appellate Body is increasingly being called upon to inter-
pret complex WTO agreements that can have far-reaching eco-
nomic and social ramifications for member states. As a result of
the glacial pace of the current Doha Round and the difficulty of
member states in using Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement
process for amending the WTO agreements, member states are in-
creasingly relying on the Appellate Body to solve disputes that at
times would best be left to political processes. In this environment,
the Appellate Body has understandably sought to ground its deci-
sions in the least controversial source, the text of the WTO agree-
ments.
While this approach is definitely correct, interpretation of the
texts can often only take the Appellate Body so far. As a result, it
has often been forced to rely on other interpretative tools for its de-
162 GSP, supra note 101, 91-99 (determining how the enabling clause oper-
ates by looking to the object and purpose in the preamble of the WTO Agree-
ment); Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 53, 129.
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cisions. At times these are expressly recognized by the Appellate
Body, while at other times they are hidden beneath a veneer of tex-
tual rhetoric. This Article has considered some of these interpreta-
tive tools and their legitimacy in light of their implications for state
sovereignty.
This Article has suggested that some of the more obvious ap-
proaches to interpreting the WTO agreements, such as in dubio
mitius, which are traditionally understood as being consistent with
deference to state sovereignty, are not only without basis in the
text of the WTO agreements but are also contrary to an under-
standing of the WTO as capable of reinforcing state sovereignty. In
contrast, this Article has suggested that different understandings of
state sovereignty point to other non-textual justifications for Ap-
pellate Body decisions that take into account the sovereignty-
enhancing role of membership in the WTO.
Finally, failure by the Appellate Body to expressly state and
explain the reasoning underlying its decisions, even when its ra-
tionales are not as strictly textual as they may desire, undermines
the legitimacy of Appellate Body decisions. Instead, this Article
argues that a clearer articulation of justifications that are based on
the sovereignty-enhancing role of WTO membership will increase
the legitimacy of Appellate Body decisions, and avoid the other-
wise tortured and often unconvincing textual analysis that the Ap-
pellate Body currently feels it is obliged to perform.
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